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Abstract: This paper analyzes the governance practices in the dimension of the family and
ownership, and its impact in the financial and family performance. From an empirical
perspective, we provide a exploratory evidence on how the governance practice in the structures
of governance in the family and ownership, impacts in the financial results and the socioemotional
wealth of the family.The results show that the implementation of corporate governance practices
in the family and ownership dimensions is not a reliable indicator of a direct relationship with
business performance. In addition, we found strong tendencies to preserve the family’s
socioemotional wealth. Furthermore, unity, honesty, transparency and amity are factors boosting
both family and business success.This study has some limitations, the qualitative method used,
such as the case study, allows an analytic exploration of the findings. However, it would be
suitable further future quantitive approaches to generalize our results and extract more objective
conclusions.
Keywords: Family firm, Performance, Ownership, Socioemotional wealth, Stewardship theory,
Corporate governance
1. INTRODUCTION
The fall of giant corporations throughout the world, such as Enron and Xerox,
among others, has left behind deep scars in the business world in general. It has
been demonstrated that the debacle of these organizations could have been caused
by lack of corporate governance (Che Haat et al., 2008). Financial scandals in the
United States led to a better understanding of far-reaching effects as a result of
poor corporate governance practices in the country’s economy.
Although prior empirical literature is vast, studies focusing on the
relationshipbetween corporative governance practices and the company’s market
value or financial performance have shown mixed results (Renders et al., 2010).
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Black, (2001); Black et al., (2006) show a positive impact on the market value due to
the implementation of corporate governance practices in countries with emerging
economies. While Bauer, Gunster and Otten (2004) establish a non-significant
relationship between corporate governance index and/or market value or
accounting ratios, and in some cases, even a negative relationship.
On the other hand, the research linking good corporate governance practices
in thefamily and ownership dimensions in the Family Business (FB) and its impact
on thesocioemotional wealth (SEW) are scarce.
The literature review show that a comprehensive and thorough research on
the impact Corporate Governance practices have on family and ownership
dimensions, with FB financial performance and the SEW have not been established
yet. Moreover, little is known about how said practices affect business performance,
family union and harmony, what role the family plays in the different governing
bodies, and what the financial return isfor those family-owned businesses adopting
these good corporate governance practices.
By the above the objective of this paper is to determine the impact of the
implementation of Corporate Governance practices in the Family and Ownership
dimensions, while observing the impact on the FB performance and SEW of the
family.We use a qualitative approach to explore some propositions made in the
next section, in relation the implementation of good practices. Not being able to be
generalized, our results give us a new insight of performance and socioemotional
consequences of several practices. Further future research with quantitative
approaches would be needed to get objective conclusions.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The second part is
dedicated to presenting theoretical framework and derived our propositions. The
third part explains the research design and methodology. The cross-analysis are
found in the fourth part. Finally, conclusions and limitations are presented.
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND PROPOSITION DEVELOPMENT
2.1. Theoretical Framework
The Stewardship Theory has been selected as this research framework.
StewardshipTheory has its roots in psychology and sociology. It was developed to
examine situations inwhich executives and managers are motivated to act for the
best interests of their directors(Donaldson & Davis, 1991).
The Stewardship Theory has been identified by researchers as potentially
applicableto the FB field because of its management philosophy directed towards
participation, solididentification, little use of institutional power, and social and
personal growth (Corbetta and Salvato, 2004; Miller and Le Breton-Miller, 2006;
Miller et al.., 2008). Researchersconducting investigations on Stewardship Theory
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assume there is a strong relationshipbetween the success of the company and the
family’s satisfaction (Davis, et al.., 1997), andthis means good alignment of family’s
and agent’s interests (Jaskiewicz and Klein, 2007).The belief is that stewards are
intrinsically motivated by higher-level needs to act for thecollective good of their
firms. They identify with the organization and its objectives (Davis et al., 2000).
Furthermore, the assumptions underlying the Stewardship Theory are
identifiedwith some features or attributes that have been found in the FB. For
instance, a high levelof commitment (Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2005), trust between
family members (Coleman, 1990) and long-term orientation (Miller & Le Breton-
Miller, 2006), amongothers, are part of the relations among family members,
relations between family andbusiness, supporting the implementation of good
corporate governance practices that canpositively influence business performance
and contribute to the preservation ofsocioemotional wealth.
2.2. Proposition development
In the FB, three interconnected systems are present: the family, ownership and
thecompany (Davis and Tagiuri, 1982). Governance structures in each system play
a majorpart as they define roles, accountability, rights and autonomy. According
to Gómez (2010),corporate governance requires a balance of power among the
three systems and if theywork as a single system, there will be a strong and balanced
power base, because theirinteraction is the key to success. This suggests that if FBs
implement good corporategovernance practices in the family and ownership
system, these should contribute on thecompany’s financial performance and to
preserve the socioemotional wealth (See Figure 1).
Figure 1: Conceptual Model
Source:Authors
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2.2.1. Family Corporate Governance Practice
Family Protocol
One of the corporate governance practices recommended for the FB
governancesystems is including governance mechanisms in the family structure
aiming at anticipatingfamily issues that might permeate and affect the company
(Suárez and Santana-Martín,2004). Among these instruments, we could identify
the family protocol; in this way, it isnot an attempt to guarantee that only positive
family aspects may affect the capital stock,but also to avoid family issues that
might jeopardize the long-term survival of the Company (Suárez and Santana-
Martín, 204).
According to Gómez (2010), family protocol is defined as a valuable process to
thefamily in which participants are urged to dialogue, debate and dream about a
better futurethat will be beneficial to present and future generations. The protocol
is part of a familyagreement to ensure continuity and success of the family business
(FB) and because of that,it is not only a written document, but also a process based
on communication allowing FBgrowth (Tàpies and Ceja, 2011). The family protocol
mission is to maintain and strengthen,through generations, family unit and the
commitment to the success of the company (Galloand Tomaselli, 2006; Gómez,
2010).
Considering the major role, that family protocol plays for the continuity and
successof FBs, studies examining the existence, effectiveness and economic impact
offamilyprotocols are scarce (Tàpies and Ceja, 2011). Roibal et al.., (2008) found
that the higher theequity capital in the hands of the family, the more family
protocols and the longer theexistence of the company, associated with the existence
of protocols.Furthermore, Tàpiesand Ceja (2011) showed in their study that 55%
of FBs in Spain do not have a familyprotocol. Gómez (2004) finds a positive and
excellent relationship between the familyprotocol and the company’s financial
performance. However, research shows that protocolsare found in large FBs,
measured by the number of employees in the company.
When it comes to family protocol, we find a very important structure, which is
thefamily. The definition of family involves certain bonds based on trusting
relationships.Trust can provide a competitive advantage for those organizations
whosegovernancemechanisms are founded on it (Hosmer, 1995; Steier, 2001).
From the stewardship perspective, trust becomes an important factor to
maintaincohesion and family union (Carlock and Ward, 2003). Nevertheless, FB
evolution andchanges in relationships among people involved with the family
and the company couldruin trust. Therefore, it is necessary to invest in governance
mechanisms, such as the familyprotocol, in order to strengthen trust among family
members. In view of the above, thefollowing proposition has been proposed:
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P1a: The implementation of a family protocol has a positive impact on
the company’s financial performance.
The implementation of a family protocol helps to promote unity and
harmonyamong family members, to professionalize them as business owners and
to preserve thosevalues that help strengthen FBs (Barbeito et al.., 2008). Upon
developing a family protocol,family members should identify and pass the FB
purpose on to future generations, as wellas the values, beliefs, mission and vision
inspiring the family (Tàpies, 2011). Thus, theprotocol sets the objectives and goals
pursued by the family and the company, as well asthe rules governing the
relationships between both systems. In view of the above, it hasbeen proposed:
P1b: The implementation of a family protocol helps preserve
Socioemotional wealth.
2.2.2. Ownership Corporate Governances Practices
General Shareholders’ Meeting
The General Shareholders’ Meeting (GSM) is one of the corporate governance
toolsthat allows shareholders to supervise the company directors and therefore,
to preventstewards from making decisions against the shareholders’ interests.
Those shareholders notinvolved in management might not be willing to invest in
the company if they have noconfidence in the directors and deem that their
investments are at risk (La Porta et al., 2000a).
Many researchers have studied the role majority shareholders play in the
company’scorporate governance (De Jong et al., 2004). However, those mechanisms
used byshareholders to exercise control have received little attention. The GSM is
important forshareholders to exercise their control rights.
Studies connecting GSMs with the company’s financial performance are scarce
andinconclusive. The existing literature has focused on the shareholders’ activities
in the GSMand has evidenced mixed results as regards an increase in firm value
due to propositions madeby shareholders, measured by the short-term reactions
of market values and/or long-termprofitability (Wahal, 1996; Prevost and Rao,
2000).
Cuñat et al.., (2012) have investigated whether improvements on the
company’sinternal corporate governance lead to shareholder value. This study
analyses the marketreaction to governance proposals that pass or fail to pass by a
small margin of votes at theGSM. Researchers have found that the approval of a
proposition leads to unusual positiveperformance and its implementation increases
the firm value by 2,8%.
The GSM, as a good corporate governance practice, plays a significant part
withregard to the way: a) Board members and shareholders interact; b) the behavior
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of Boardmembers and top management team members is supervised and c) action
intended toprotect the interests of shareholders and those of interest groups is
taken. Consequently,based on the Stewardship Theory, it has been suggested that
working relationship amongfamily members, Board members and stewards is
characterized by a high level of trust (Davis, 1983). Similarly, the long-term
perspective of FB makes it easier when establishingand maintaining relationships
with stakeholders (Carney, 2005). In view of the above, thefollowing proposition
has been proposed:
P2a: The implementation of a General Shareholders’ Meeting has a
positive effect on the company’s financial performance.
In recent years, researchers have studied the reasons shareholders have to use
theirownership position in order to pursue their particularistic agendas (Thomsen
and Pedersen, 2000; Ryan and Schneider, 2002). Some studies have evidenced that
families havepreferences for non-economic objectives (Sharma et al., 1997; Anderson
and Reeb, 2003). This includes the corporate identity (Kepner, 1983), projecting
and perpetuating a positivefamily image and reputation (Westhead et al., 2001;
Sharma and Manikuti, 2005), enjoyingpersonal prestige in the community, having
the support of the community andacquaintances (Taguiri and Davis, 1992; Corbetta
and Salvato, 2004); and the accumulationof social capital (Arregle et al., 2007),
among others to preserve the SEW. In view of theabove, the following proposition
has been proposed:
P2b: The implementation of a General Shareholders’ Meeting helps
preserve Socioemotional wealth.
Dividend Policy
The dividend policy is a good corporate governance practice ideal to limit and/
oravoid depriving minority shareholders of wealth (La Porta et al.., 2000b), because
it guarantees proportional payments to both majority and minority shareholders.
Dividendpayment arises as a corporate governance mechanism due to the need to
align the interestsof minority investors and those of majority investors (Pindado
et al., 2012).
Fama and French (2001) have evidenced that dividend payment probability
isassociated with the company’s size, growth opportunities and financial
performance.Additionally, dividend payment possibility is strongly associated with
the ratio of retainedearnings to equity. Denis and Osobov (2008) have stated that
companies paying dividendstend to be bigger and more profitable, and have less
investment opportunities.
In FBs, dividends serve as a disciplinary mechanism to prevent the
controllingfamily from expropriating minority shareholders’ wealth (Setia-Atmaja
et al.., 2009). Additionally, family control can have a positive influence on dividends
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if FBs see them as amechanism to reward minority investors and mitigate
expropriation in favor of largeinvestors (Setia-Atmaja et al., 2009). Besides, FBs
can use dividend payments as a tool toestablish a reputation for fair treatment to
minority investors (Yoshikawa and Rasheed, 2010).
Moreover, FBs use dividend payments to build trust (Pindado et al., 2012).
Therefore, they may waive the benefits they could have for having control over
the company by distributing higher and more dividends in relation to non-family
businesses. Infact, dividends can be regarded as a financial disadvantage to FBs
because FB owners wantto keep control (Gómez-Mejía, et al.., 2010). Compared
with other available corporategovernance mechanisms, dividend payment is a more
credible signal of owners’commitment not to expropriate minority investors and
to waive private control benefits.Moreover, FBs with better corporate governance
structures use dividends as a governancetool to mitigate expropriation concerns
(Pindado et al.., 2012).
In general, families may influence important corporate decisions made by
thecompany, such as those related to the dividend policy and the top management
team, andshould make decisions leading to favor the FB owners (Jiang and Peng,
2011). In brief, andbased on one of the Stewardship Theory premises, managers
are regarded as trustworthyindividuals and consequently as good stewards of
allocated resources (Donaldson andDavis, 1991, 1994), able to make decisions in
the interest of the owners, thus reflectingbetter business performance. Therefore,
and taking into consideration dividend policies as amechanism to build trust and
a signal of owners’ commitment to the rest of theorganization, the following
proposition has been proposed:
P3a: The implementation of a dividend distribution policy has a
positive effect on the company’s financial performance.
Those FBs whose main aim is to reach non-financial goals build emotional
value (Astrachan and Jaskiewicz, 2008, Zellweger and Astrachan 2008) or SWE for
the family (Gómez-Mejía et al.., 2007). Research literature provides evidence that
FB dominantcoalition may be able to extract additional value from firm ownership
at the expense of theother shareholders through the dividend policy in order to
preserve SEW (Morck et al., 1988, Villalonga and Amit 2006). In view of the above,
it has been proposed:
P3b: The implementation of a dividend distribution policy helps to
preserve socioemotional wealth.
2.3. Performance
The existing literature on the FB research field has clearly shown that financial
performance is not the only objective FBs have (Zellweger and Nason 2008), and
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that theyoften express a strong preference for non-economic performance
(Astrachan and Jaskiewicz 2008; Chrisman et al., 2003), as well as for the SWE of
the business (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007). According to Astrachan and Jaskiewicz
(2008), the total value of a company doesnot only consist of its financial value and
private benefits, but also of the emotionalcomponent which also has an impact on
the company’s valuation. This study will makereference to performance as the
union of two factors: First, financial performance andsecond, SEW, as family
performance.
2.3.1. Financial Performance
ROA (Return on assets): is used as a financial performance indicator because it
allowsexamining the effect of family influence on ownership, and management
on the company’sprofitability (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Sciascia and Mazzola,
2008). Chang and Choi (1988) indicate that this ratio is a proper measure of
operational efficiency, because in mostemerging economies, capital markets are
imperfect and debt-equity ratio is usually high.
Sales Growth: this indicator is regarded as a more reliable measure of the FB
financialperformance than the traditional measures based on earnings, because
FBs have incentivesto minimize reported taxable income and no incentives at all
to minimize reported sales(Dess and Robinson, 1984).
EBITDA: is calculated as earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and
amortizationdivided by the total assets. Kowalewski et al.., (2010) use this indicator
to analyze thecompany’s operational performance. This indicator is selected
because it cannot bemanipulated as other measures allowing, to a certain extent,
selection of depreciation andtax regime.
2.3.2. Socioemotional Wealth
To measure the family’s SEW, we will use the construct proposed by Berrone et al.,
(2012) FIBER. This construct consists of five dimensions, which are detailed below:
a) Family control and influence: A characteristic of family-owned companies
is thatfamily members have control over strategic decisions (Chua et al.,
1999; Schulze,Lubatkin, and Dino, 2003). Control can be exercised directly,
as CEO and/or Board Chair, or in a more subtle way, for instance, as a
member of the topmanagement team.
b) Identification of family members with the company: Numerous
researchers statethat the connection between the family and the company
leads a unique identitywithin FBs (Berrone et al., 2010; Dyer and Whetten,
2006). The identity of FBowners is inextricably linked to the organization,
which usually has the familyname.
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c) Social relations of the company: Some recent research conducted by Cruz
et al., (2012) states that SEW provides kinship ties along with some
collective benefitsarising in closed networks, including collective social
capital and trustingrelationships (Coleman, 1990). Very often, FBs have
long-term relationships withsome suppliers and treat some others as
family members (Uhlaner, 2006).Moreover, family businesses’ sense of
belonging and identity are often shared by non-family employees,
promoting a sense of stability and commitment to thecompany (Miller
and Le Breton-Miller, 2005).
d) Emotional attachment of family members: This dimension refers to the
roleemotions play in the FB context. In fact, many scholars see the
combination ofemotional factors arising from family involvement with
business factors as adistinctive attribute of FB (Eddleston and Kellermanns,
2007; Taguiri and Davis, 1996).
e) Renewing family bonds to the company: This dimension refers to the
intention totransfer the company to future generations. In fact, Zellweger
and Astrachan (2008), and Zellweger, et al. ,  (2012) suggest
transgenerational sustainability as one of the central aspects of SEW.
3. METHODOLOGY
We employed case studies in our study. Our motivation converged with Yin (2003)
insight that this method is appropriate to uncover social dynamics obtaining a “why”
and “how” character. The sample consists of four (4) cases of Colombian FB of second
or further generations (see Table I), from different economic sectors (services,




Saturn Ownership of the company is equally shared between seven (7) brothers,
represented through seven (7) companies. In 2000, the owners started the
process of structuring the governance bodies of a family business. Nowadays,
on the dimension of the family, they have implemented a Family Assembly, a
Family Council and Family Protocol. On the dimension of the property, they
have a General Shareholders’ Meetings (GSM) and a Dividend Policy.
Mars Two family companies hold ownership of the company. The owners do not
have any governance structure on the dimension of the family. As for the
dimension of the property, they are implementing GSM and a Dividend Policy.
However, this is merely done to follow the requirements of the law, since
being only 2 people representing the companies, it is easier report delivering
and decision-making.
contd. table 1
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Company Description
Jupiter Ownership of the company is concentrated in Orion family, with a share of
72%, who have control over the company. Owners have no governance
structure in the dimension of the family. Furthermore, owners are
implementing good corporate governance practices, having in place a GSM
Meetings and Dividend Policy.
Mercury Four (4) families hold ownership of the company. Since 1999, the owners have
established and are implementing a Family Assembly, a Council and Family
protocol in the dimension of the family and a GSM and a Dividends Policy in
the dimension of Property. At the present, the company is in the process of
generational transfer from the second to the third generation in the governance
of the company.
Source: Prepared from information supplied by the company
The information was collected taking advantage of three sources: semi –
structuredinterviews, direct observation, revision of documents and archives. This
is to show the reality of FB and to enable the participation of its members, which
particularly backs up the findings, meaning and relevance of the studied topic.
The semi-structured interviews were made to family members and owners from
second generations according to the research questions.
Table 2
General Information and financial companies (2010 – 2015)
SATURN MARS JUPITER MERCURY
Industrial sector Social expression Food and Terrestrial Agro-industrial
beverages transport machinery and
passengers equipment
Years of 50 45 54 54
incorporation
Size Medium Small Medium Small
Sales revenue 33,176 16,251 24,914 12,509
(US millions)
Total assets 21,905 14,881 17,654 7,661
(US millions)
Net worth 9,333 6,714 8,646 2,111
(US millions)
Total Liabilities 12,572 11,624 0,000 0,000
(US millions)
ROA 4,50% 1,42% 4,49% 10,56%
Sales Growth 9,27% 8,95% 10,96% 23,88%
EBITDA 8,07% 6,24% 8,12% 13,57%
Source:  Prepared from information supplied by the company
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4. CROSS-CASE ANALYSIS
One of the challenges with regard to multiple-case research is how to stay within
the spatial limits while conveying the emergent theory, which is the research
objective, and the varied empirical evidence supporting the theory (Eisenhardt
and Graebner, 2007). Therefore, an approach as described by Yin (2003) has been
adopted, where there is an individual section for each corporate governance practice
in each FB dimension.
Based on the foregoing, a cross-case analysis is carried out using information
onindividual cases. In brief, a comparison between the case that has implemented
goodcorporate governance practices to a considerable extent and the case that has
implementedthem to a lesser extent is made, and in this way, the six (6) propositions
brought forward arethen supported.
4.1. Family Corporate Governance Practice
Family Protocol
The main purpose of this protocol is to regulate family-business
relationships,including important matters such as conflict solution, and inclusion
of family members inthe company, among others. These relationships are based
on trust, commitment, transparency and honesty, helping family members to align
family objectives andcorporate objectives, thus improving harmony and cohesion,
allowing family membersto work together, to respond faster to any situation, to
be more flexible, to use bettertechniques in order to solve problems and to be
more productive and efficient (Smith et al., 1994).
One of the key things when developing and implementing a family protocol is
theway it is conceived. As defined by Gómez (2010), this document is the result of
animportant process during which family members may discuss, debate, and
envisionthemselves in the future, both as a business and as a family. This scenario
allows settingaside resentment, impasses and uncomfortable situations among
family members, thusstrengthening their relationship, and promoting harmony,
commitment and cohesion withinthe family (Ward, 2004).
Nevertheless, when relationships among family members are based of trust
andcommitment, any kind of disagreement might damage them, thus affecting
harmony andcohesion. Consequently, this could be detrimental to the decision-
making process regardingthe family and the business because of the difficulty in
aligning objectives. Moreover, family relationships may eventually deteriorate,
and affect harmony and business growth.
The analysis suggests that the family protocol is a practice that does not
contributedirectly to the profitability of the company. Its main purpose is to regulate
familybusinessrelationships by defining the role that family members play in each
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governancestructure. Brenes et al., (2011),found that transparency in the Company
management is the major benefit of the implementation of family protocol, as the
rules of thegame have been set in a highly participatory process involving the
entire family with aconflict-solving mechanism established. Moreover, this
governance mechanism does nothave a direct influence on the corporate decision-
making process. Therefore, the proposition 1a is no supported.
On the other hand, the implementation of a family protocol helps preventing
andforeseeing problems among family members that might affect the business
operations (Suáreand Santana-Martín, 2004). This agreement made by family
members is a dynamic tool inconstant review due to family needs arising day by
day, and therefore, it requires updatingon a regular basis.
It should be noted that the success of a family protocol depends on the
relationshipsamong family members, characterized by respect, transparency, love,
trust, commitmentand honesty (Gallo and Tomaselli, 2006). Moreover, succeeding
at implementing theprotocol contributes to harmony, cohesion and the preservation
of the socio-emotionalwealth of family members. In view of the above, proposition
1b, which suggested that theimplementation of a family protocol helps preserve
socio-emotional wealth, is consideredsupported.
4.2. Ownership Corporate Governances Practices
General Shareholders’ Meeting (GSM)
Within the ownership governance structure, we find a significant concentration
ofpower in one or two families higher than 80%. The results are similar to those
obtained byPombo and Gutiérrez (2010), who evidenced that 74% of ownership in
Colombia wasconcentrated in the hands of one or two families.
Implementing a GSM, as a good corporate governance practice, allows
endorsing thedecisions made by other governance structures and the proposals
made by the Board ofDirectors in an expeditious and effective manner, because of
the permanent communicationwith those family members involved in the
governance bodies of the organization.
On the other hand, concentration of ownership in the hands of one or more
familiesallows having influence over the decisions made by the GSM, which are
oriented towardachieving financial and nonfinancial objectives. These decisions
may be subject to therelationships among the business-owning family members,
which may benefit fromeffective communication and values such as honesty,
commitment and trust, among others.All these factors contribute to family unity,
harmony and cohesion, thus facilitating thealignment of family objectives and
corporate objectives. Additionally, the GSM allows allthe family members to gather
and reach objectives different from those required bylaw.
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The companies analyzed have established a GSM and show increasing and
positivefinancial indicators. Nevertheless, there is no evidence showing that the
simple fact thatthey have implemented a good governance practice such as the
GSM is enough tocontribute to business performance. Moreover, there is neither
available information nor afollow-up process with regard to the effect that decisions
made by the GSM have on theprofitability of the company.
Since the FBs set financial and nonfinancial goals, and because it is likely that
decisionsmade by the GSM give priority to family or nonfinancial goals, proposition
2a is notsupported.
As to this particular research, the GSMs show significant concentration
ofownership in the hands of one or more families, which allows them to have an
influence onthe decision-making process aimed at meeting the emotional needs
of the family (Kets deVries, 1993), giving priority to nonfinancial goals over financial
goals.
When business-owning family members share the same vision of their
futureprojection as a family and as a business, it is possible to align family objectives
andcorporate objectives. The alignment of objectives depends on trust among
family members(Davis, 1983), supporting the Stewardship Theory (Donaldson and
Davis, 1991), whichcontributes to cohesion, well-being, harmony and socio-
emotional wealth preservation. Inview of the above, proposition2b,which suggested
that the implementation of a GSM helpspreserving socio-emotional wealth, is
considered supported.
Dividend Policies
This good practice and its impact on the business profitability is subject to
thedecisions made by the GSM (Jiang and Peng, 2011). The GSM makes decisions
based on family objectives and corporate objectives set by this governance body.
The companies under study have a defined, explicit and flexible dividend
policy. The owners are fully aware that the distribution is subject to business
performance and the balance between business investment needs and family needs.
A characteristic most of the companies analyzed have in common is healthy
finances and conservative debt levels.
Distribution of dividends is subject to the decisions made by the owning
members, based on the goals set according to the family and business needs, which
may have a favorable or unfavorable effect on the profitability of the company.
Therefore, proposition 3a, which suggested that the implementation of a dividend
policy has a positive effect on the company’s financial performance, is not supported.
The distribution of dividends among family members may be regarded as the
resultfrom good management by those family members who participate actively
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in business management. Dividends payment seeks to meet the needs of active
and passive business-owning families. In the cases analyzed, most business-owning
family members use dividends to improve quality of life. Therefore, this corporate
governance practice contributes to harmony, cohesion and the preservation of the
socio-emotional wealth of the family. In view of the above, proposition3b,which
suggested that the implementation of a dividend distribution policy helps preserve
SEW, is considered supported
In brief, after making the cross analysis of cases, a new model (Figure 2) is
proposed. This new model suggests that good corporate governance practices in
the FB are directly related to the socioemotional wealth preservation (non- economic
objectives).
Considering that, the preservation of socioemotional wealth cannot be isolated
from company profits, indirect and double track on economic performance
relationship is defined. Finally, these corporate governance practices have an
indirect bearing on economic performance.
Figure 2: New Model Proposed
Source:Authors
5. CONCLUSIONS
The aim of this research was to determine the impact that the implementation
ofgood corporate governance practices has on FB governance structures, on its
dimensions of family and ownership, as well as on the financial and SEW.
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The qualitative analysis indicates that whether or not a family protocol has
been implemented isnot a reliable indicator, and does not have a direct relationship
with business performance. Therefore, the implementation of a family protocol as
a good corporate governance practiceis not conclusive. In other words, not having
a family protocol is not an obstacle that wouldprevent the company from
succeeding. On the contrary, the evidence shows us that thereare some factors
that can replace this mechanism such as, cohesion, transparency andhonesty, as
fundamental pillars to build relationships among family members and
familybusiness.
One of the most important aspects identified is the unlimited power that
familymembers have over business ownership, control and management. This is
evidenced by theactive involvement of family members in all the governance
structures of the company.Furthermore, cohesion, harmony, communication and
commitment of business-owningfamilies favor their relationship and the link
between the family and the company,thus facilitating the alignment of corporate
objectives and family objectives. Some of thesefactors are identified and support
under Stewardship Theory.
Therefore, implementing a good corporate governance practice such as a
GSMallows some space for them to endorse those decisions made by other
governance structuresan expeditious and effective manner, because of the
continuous communication with thefamily members involved in the organization’s
governance bodies.
Dividend distribution is a common practice in the companies studied; and it
shouldbe highlighted that business-owning family members use dividends to
improve quality oflife. Consequently, it gives them the opportunity to be flexible
when distributing them inorder to invest the necessary resources to continue
growing and expanding. Thiscorroborates the objectivity in making decisions for
the organization and not the individualbenefit, which is in line with the economic
model of the Stewardship Theory.
Another characteristic identified is risk aversion; owners prefer to sacrifice a
lowerdividend payout to finance investments than to incur a financial debt, because
they find itcost saving when developing investment projects. This finding is
contrary to the assumptions put forward by the Stewardship Theory, which
considers the owner’s attitude tends towards risk appetite. Furthermore, this
corporate governance practice is an indirect mechanism to evaluate performance
by those family members running the company.
This research has been subject to some limitations. The qualitative method
used,suchas the case study, allows an analytic exploration of the findings.
Nevertheless, performing a quantitative analysis would the opportunity to broaden
the study in order to contrast the propositions stated, with different perspectives
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in research. A more generalized result would be needed. The difficulty in
establishing limits in regard to the subject matter under consideration, the nature
of the social reality under study, and the relationship between the researcher and
the individuals involved in the cases under study (Ryan et al.., 2004).
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